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1. Introduction  
All three of the main regional human rights treaties, the European Convention on Human Rights, 
the American Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, have been interpreted to include a specific, positive duty to investigate violations of the 
right to life. This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the jurisprudence on point of the 
European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights 
and the African Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. It will consider whether 
there is harmonization or fragmentation of international human rights law in this area; what the 
consequences are for human rights protection and whether harmonization is desirable in those 
areas related to the duty to investigate, such as reparations, where strong divergence is found 
across the regional systems. 
The chapter seeks first to analyse the nature of the investigative duty and its various elements, 
as well as how it arises. It considers to what extent there are differences in investigatory 
standards as between individual and systemic cases, and as between enforced disappearances 
and other right to life cases. It assesses the legitimacy of domestic amnesty laws and statutes of 
limitation and the application by the three regional systems of admissibility criteria and the 
burden of proof. Finally, it considers the inter-relationship of the right to life and the right to know 
the truth, before turning to the question of reparations.  
2. The duty to investigate 
The duty to investigate fatal incidents derives in each of the regional treaties not only from the 
specific substantive provisions on the right to life, but also from the more general obligations to 
ensure that the rights in the treaties are upheld, namely Article 1(1) of the American Convention 
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on Human Rights,1 and Article 1 of both the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR)2 and of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).3 None of these regional 
treaties refers expressly to an obligation on the state to conduct an investigation,4 but for more 
than two decades the case-law of the three regional systems has cemented such a duty into the 
corpus of international human rights law, and has elaborated and refined more clearly what the 
obligation entails. 
 
A. Concept of due diligence and general principles of the duty to investigate 
 
A general concept of due diligence in carrying out investigations has been relied on and 
developed by all three of the regional systems, with varying degrees of specificity and detail. 
The wording utilized to characterise the overall standard differs: the African Commission has 
expressly adopted the standard of due diligence from the Inter-American Court’s judgment in 
Velásquez Rodríguez,5 whereas the European Court has tended principally to focus on the 
need for an ‘effective, official investigation’.6 Nevertheless, there are a number of core 
constituent elements of the duty to investigate which can be seen from each of the regional 
systems, but which have perhaps been articulated most explicitly and consistently by the 
European institutions.7 These are as follows: 
  
                                                          
1 Inter-American Court, Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, Merits, Judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C No 
4 (1988), para 166. Article 4 of the American Convention provides for the right to life.  
2 African Commission, 74/92, Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v Chad (1995), 
and 245/02, Zimbabwe NGO Human Rights Forum v Zimbabwe (2006), para 153. Article 4 of the African 
Charter provides for the right to life. 
3 European Court, McCann v UK, Application No 18984/91, Judgment, 27 September 1995, para 161. 
Article 2 of the European Convention provides for the right to life. 
4 However, other more recently adopted regional treaties contain an express obligation to investigate 
deaths and/or torture and/or forms of violence. See, for example: Article 8 of the Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985); Article 7(b) of the Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (‘Convention of Belém do Para’) 
(1994); Articles I and III of the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons 
(1994). At the international level, see, for example, Article 3 of the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006). 
5 African Commission, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, supra n 2, paras 146-148. 
6 European Court, Hugh Jordan v UK, Application No 24746/94, Judgment, 4 May 2001, para 105. The 
European Court has referred to the need for the authorities to act with ‘exemplary diligence’ (see, e.g., 
European Court, Öneryıldız v Turkey, Application No 48939/99, Judgment, 30 November 2004, para 94). 
It has referred to the concept of ‘due diligence’ most often in relation to the duty to protect life under 
Article 2 (see, e.g., European Court, Opuz v Turkey, Application No 33401/02, Judgment, 9 June 2009, 
paras 131 and 137-149). See also European Court, Banel v Lithuania, Application No 14326/11, 
Judgment, 18 June 2013, paras 71-72. 
7 See, by way of example, European Court, Hugh Jordan v UK, ibid, paras 105-109. 
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(i) Instigate investigation on own initiative 
All three systems require that the State instigate the investigation on its own initiative: it cannot 
be left to the victims, complainants or next-of-kin to lodge a complaint and the State cannot 
avoid its obligations by arguing that it did not investigate because the victim failed to lodge a 
complaint.8  
 
(ii) The investigation should be effective 
For all three systems a simple requirement to investigate is not enough,9 the investigation must 
be effective.10 In order to satisfy this requirement, it cannot be determined in the abstract:11 
‘each case must be treated on its own merits depending on the specific circumstances of the 
case and the rights violated’.12 The European Court, therefore, has held that the authorities 
must take reasonable steps to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, 
eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an autopsy providing a 
complete and accurate record of injury and an objective analysis of clinical findings, including 
the cause of death.13 The European Court has also stipulated that any deficiency in the 
investigation which undermines its ability to identify the perpetrator or perpetrators will risk 
falling foul of this standard.14 The obligation to investigate effectively may of course have 
implications for the provision of the necessary resources, which has been expressly noted by 
the African Commission.15 
 
The Inter-American Court has underlined that the effectiveness of an investigation into a killing 
has to be visible from 
                                                          
8 Inter-American Court, Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, supra n 1, para 177; Manuel Cepeda Vargas v 
Colombia, Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, Judgment of 26 May 2010, Series C No 
213 (2010), para 117; African Commission, 275/03, Article 19 v State of Eritrea (2007), para 72; European 
Court, Ilhan v Turkey, Application No 22277/93, 27June 2000, para 63. 
9 African Commission, 279/03-296/05, Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights 
and Evictions (COHRE) v The Sudan (2009), para 149. 
10 See, for example, African Commission, Resolution on Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and 
Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa (Robben Island 
Guidelines), ACHPR/RES/61, 2002, article 19. 
11 Inter-American Court, Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras, supra n 1. 
12 African Commission, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, supra n 2, para 155. 
13 European Court, Anguelova v Bulgaria, Application No 38361/97, Judgment, 13 June 2002, para 139. 
14 European Court, Ramsahai and others v Netherlands, Application No 52391/99, Judgment, 15 May 2007, 
para 324. 
15 African Commission, 48/90-50/91-52/91-89/93, Amnesty International, Comité Loosli Bachelard and 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Association of Members of the Episcopal Conference of East 
Africa v Sudan, (1999). 
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‘…the first proceedings with all diligence….State authorities that carry out an investigation 
must, inter alia, a) identify the victim; b) recover and preserve the evidentiary material related 
to the case; c) identify possible witnesses and obtain their statements with regard to the death 
that is being investigated; d) determine the cause, form, place, and moment of death, as well 
as any proceeding or practice that could have caused it, and e) distinguish between a natural 
death, an accidental death, a suicide, or a homicide. Besides, it is necessary to thoroughly 
investigate the crime scene, autopsies and competent professionals employing the most 
appropriate procedures must carefully practice analysis of the human remains.’16 
 
A further requirement, identified by the Inter-American Court in Velásquez Rodríguez and cited expressly 
by the African Commission, is that the investigation should be ‘serious’. However, this does not appear to 
have a different meaning to the need to conduct a diligent investigation. According to the Inter-American 
Court, the State has a legal duty ‘’to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of 
violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate 
punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation’’.17 Equally, the Court has maintained that 
‘’an investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step 
taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of 
proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government’’. To this, the African Commission has 
added that the seriousness of the investigation must be evaluated ‘through the actions of both State 
agencies and private actors on a case-by-case basis’.18 The Commission has therefore required that 
States ‘use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its 
jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim 
adequate compensation’.19 
 
Furthermore, where new evidence subsequently comes to light, an effective investigation requires that 
State authorities are ‘sensitive to any information or material which has the potential either to undermine 
the conclusions of an earlier investigation or to allow an earlier inconclusive investigation to be pursued 
further’.20 In making such assessments, the authorities are entitled to take account of the passage of time 
and the prospects of success: 
 
‘the fresh obligation to investigate will vary according to the nature of the purported new evidence or 
information. It may be restricted to verifying the reliability of the new evidence and the authorities can 
legitimately take into account the prospects of launching a new prosecution at such a late stage. Due to 
the lapse of time, the level of urgency may have diminished; the immediacy of required investigative steps 
in the aftermath of an incident is likely to be absent’.21  
 
Whilst recognizing the challenges of access to witnesses in such circumstances, which may impair the 
availability of sufficient evidence for a prosecution, the European Court has held that the authorities ‘must 
take reasonable steps to find the available evidence and pursue the practicable leads open to them at this 
                                                          
16 Inter-American Court, Miguel Castro Castro Prison v Peru, Merits, reparations and costs, Judgment of 
25 November 2006, Series C 160 (2006), para 383. 
17 Inter-American Court, Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, supra n 1, para 179. 
18 African Commission, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, supra n 2, para 158. 
19 Ibid. 
20 European Court, Brecknell v UK, Application No 32457/04, Judgment, 27 November 2007, para 70. 
21 European Court, Charalambous and others v Turkey, Application No 46744/07, Decision, 3 April 2012. 
5 
 
time to discover the perpetrators of any unlawful violence’, and that ‘the families should be kept informed 
of any key factual conclusions and procedural developments and any reasoned decisions in this regard’.22 
 
How far does the effectiveness obligation extend? 
 
For the European Court, whilst the requirements of Article 2 do not, as such, guarantee a right 
to have criminal proceedings instituted against third parties,23 they do extend beyond the stage 
of the official investigation, where this has led to the institution of proceedings in the national 
courts. In that situation, the proceedings as a whole, including the trial stage, must satisfy the 
requirements of the positive obligation to protect lives through the law. Thus, instigating criminal 
proceedings, which are then pursued effectively, will usually be sufficient to meet the Article 2 
requirement to investigate a fatality.24 The Strasbourg Court has emphasized that ‘in the normal 
course of events a criminal trial, with an adversarial procedure before an independent and 
impartial judge must be regarded as furnishing the strongest safeguards of an effective 
procedure for the finding of facts and the attribution of criminal responsibility’.25 However, 
criminal proceedings which fail to address a ‘crucial issue’ (even where some suspects are tried, 
convicted and sentenced),26 or which fail to include a particular individual/company,27 or which 
are not sufficiently prompt,28 may violate Article 2. Furthermore, inadequate reasoning of 
domestic courts in acquitting state officials may breach Article 2,29 as may the imposition of only 
relatively light sentences30 or the failure to ensure that those convicted serve their sentences.31  
 
Although the African Commission has not elaborated as to precisely how far it considers the 
right to life extends, the Inter-American Court, like the European Court, requires that the 
prosecution and punishment of perpetrators should be effective. Incidents of torture, killing and 
enforced disappearance ‘entail the activation of national and international measures, 
instruments and mechanisms to ensure their effective prosecution and the sanction of the 
                                                          
22 Ibid, para 65. 
23 European Court, Perez v. France, Application No 47287/99, Judgment, 12 February 2004, para 70. 
24 European Court, Brecknell v UK, Application No 32457/04, Judgment, 27 November 2007, para 66. 
25 European Court, McKerr v. UK, Application No 28883/95, Judgment, 4 May 2001, para 134. 
26 European Court, Avşar v Turkey, Application, No 25657/94, Judgment, 10 July 2001. 
27 European Court, Kalender v Turkey, Application No 4314/02, Judgment, 15 December 2009. 
28 European Court, Opuz v Turkey, Application No 33401/02, Judgment, 9 June 2009. 
29 European Court, Gül v Turkey, Application No 22676/93, Judgment, 14 December 2000. 
30 European Court, Şimşek and others v Turkey, Applications Nos 35072/97 and 37194/97, Judgment, 26 
July 2005. 
31 European Court, Agache and others v Romania, No 2712/02, Judgment, 20 October 2009. 
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authors, so as to prevent them and avoid them remaining unpunished’.32 Indeed, in the case of 
Mapiripán v. Colombia, while an investigation was opened, the criminal proceedings were 
considered ineffective as ‘’the majority of those responsible ha[d] not been formally joined to the 
investigations, or they ha[d] not been identified or prosecuted […] and the trial and conviction in 
absentia of the paramilitary who, […] ha[ve] benefited from the way the judicial system has 
acted, convicting them but without executing the punishment.’’33 
 
Is it an obligation of means or result? 
 
Both the Inter-American and European bodies have held that the duty to investigate represents 
an obligation of means, not of result. Thus the European Court, for example, accepts that not 
every investigation will necessarily be successful.34 At the same time, the Inter-American Court 
has underlined that the obligation cannot be fulfilled as ‘’a simple formality predestined to be 
unsuccessful’35 but that it must be ‘directed at a specific goal, the determination of the truth and 
the investigation, pursuit, capture, prosecution and, as appropriate, punishment of those 
responsible for the facts’.36 The European Court has insisted that the investigation must be 
‘capable of leading to a determination of whether the force used was or was not justified in the 
circumstances and to the identification and punishment of those responsible’.37 
 
The African Commission appears to take a different position, although this has not been 
expressed in the particular context of the duty to investigate, but rather in relation to the general 
obligation to give effect to the Charter rights (under Article 1). The Commission has held that 
Article 1: 
 
‘imposes on the States Parties the obligation of using the necessary diligence to implement 
the provisions prescribed by the Charter since the said diligence has to evolve in relation to 
                                                          
32 Inter-American Court, Goiburú et al. v Paraguay, Merits, reparations and costs, Judgment of 22 
September 2006, Series C 153 (2006), para 128. 
33 Inter-American Court, Mapiripán Massacre v Colombia, Merits, reparations and costs, Judgment of 15 
September 2005, Series C 134 (2005), para 240. 
34 European Court, Aslakhanova and others v Russia, Application Nos 2944/06, 
8300/07, 50184/07, 332/08, 42509/10, Judgment, 18 December 2012, para 144 (as regards 
investigations into allegations of ill-treatment). 
35 Inter-American Court, Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, supra n 1, , para 177. 
36 Inter-American Court, Cantoral Huamaní and Garcia Santa Cruz v Peru, Preliminary objection, merits, 
reparations and costs, 10 July 2007, Series C 167 (2007), para 131. Inter-American Court, Pueblo Bello 
Massacre v Colombia, 31 January 2006, Series C 140 (2006), para 143. 
37 European Court, Al-Skeini v UK, Application No 55721/07, Judgment, 7 July 2011, para 166. 
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the time, space and circumstances, and has to be followed by practical action on the ground 
in order to produce concrete results. …In fact, in the Commission’s view, it is an obligation of 
RESULT that Article 1 of the African Charter imposes on the States Parties. In effect, each 
State has the obligation of guaranteeing the protection of the human rights written in the 
Charter by adopting not only the means that the Charter itself prescribes, in particular ‘all the 
necessary legislative measures for this purpose but in addition measures of their choice that 
the Charter called for by Article 1 and it therefore defined as one of result’.38 
 
It clarifies this by drawing upon Articles 20 and 21 of the International Law Commission’s Draft 
articles on State responsibility, Colozza v Italy, De Cubber v Belgium before the European Court 
and Avena before the ICJ, noting that: ‘the distinction between the obligation of diligence and 
that of result should not make one lose sight of the fact that, all obligations contained in a 
Treaty, Convention or a Charter seek to attain an objective, a purpose or a result’.39 
 
Furthermore, in the same case the Commission found that: 
 
‘The obligations prescribed by the African Charter in its Article 1 impose on the States 
Parties (the State of Cameroon included) the need to put in place all measures liable to 
produce the result of preventing all violations of the African Charter over their entire 
territory.’40 
 
(iii) Promptness and reasonable expedition 
 
For all three systems, the investigation must be prompt and carried out ‘without delay’. 41 For the 
European Court while there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in 
a particular situation, a prompt response is essential in maintaining public confidence in the authorities’ 
adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in, or tolerance of, unlawful 
acts.42 The requirement for promptness may be stricter in certain cases, such as, for the European Court, 
investigations into deaths in state custody.43   
 
                                                          
38 African Commission, 272/03, Association of Victims of Post Electoral Violence & INTERIGHTS v 
Cameroon (2009), paras 110 - 111. 
39 Ibid, para 107. 
40 Ibid, para 119-121. 
41 Inter-American Court, Contreras et al. v El Salvador, Merits, reparations and costs, Judgment of 25 
October 2012, Series C No 232, para 128. African Commission, Sudan Human Rights Organisation and 
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v The Sudan, supra n 9, para 150. See also Robben 
Island Guidelines, supra n 10. 
42 European Court, Yaşa v Turkey, Application No 22495/93, Judgment, 2 September 1998, paras 102–4. 
43 Eurpean Court, Trubnikov v Russia, Application No 49790/99, Judgment, 5 July 2005, para 88. 
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In the Inter-American System, the obligation to investigate is also linked to important obligations 
deriving from Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention which regulate due process 
guarantees and the right to judicial and other remedies. Under Article 8 in conjunction with 
Article 1(1), States have an obligation to carry out an investigation within a reasonable period of 
time. This means both that the investigation into a fatality needs to be opened as soon as the 
State has notice of it and that it should be carried out within a reasonable period of time. Indeed, 
the Inter-American Court considers that ‘the right to a fair trial requires that the determination of 
the facts under investigation and, if it were the case, of the corresponding criminal 
responsibilities be made effective in a reasonable period of time, reason for which, in attention 
to the need to guarantee the rights of the affected parties, a prolonged delay can constitute, in 
itself, a violation of the right to a fair trial’.44  
 
 
(iv) Independence and impartiality 
 
All three systems underscore the importance of those undertaking the investigations to be 
impartial and independent from those implicated in the events.45 The European Court and 
African Commission have clarified this further by noting elements of hierarchical, institutional 
and practical independence.46 Judicial impartiality, for example, will be undermined ‘when … a 
judicial official secretly participated in the investigation of a case’.47 
 
(v) Involvement of next of kin and victims 
 
In all three regional systems it has been held that the victims or their next of kin have a right to 
be involved in the procedure if they so wish and to the extent necessary to safeguard their 
legitimate interests.48 For the Inter-American system this principle also derives from the 
                                                          
44 Inter-American Court, Radilla Pacheco v Mexico, Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, 
Judgment of 23 November 2009, Series C 209 (2009), para 191. 
45 African Commission, Amnesty International, Comité Loosli Bachelard and Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights, Association of Members of the Episcopal Conference of East Africa v Sudan, supra n 15.  
46 European Court, Og̃ur v Turkey, Application No 21954/93, Judgment, 20 May 1999, paras 91–2. The 
African Commission uses the same wording in Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing 
Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v The Sudan, supra n 9, para 150. 
47 African Commission, Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, 
2003, para 5(d). 
48 European Court, Anguelova v Bulgaria, supra n 13, para 140. 
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importance attributed to the right to know the truth.49 In addition, according to the Inter-American 
Court ‘the state must ensure that the next of kin of the victims have full access and capacity to 
act at all stages and in all instances of the proceedings in accordance with the American 
Convention […] The purpose of this participation must be access to justice, knowledge of the 
truth about what happened, and obtaining fair reparation.’50 Similarly, albeit not in the context of 
a finding on an individual communication, the African Commission has also noted that 
investigations need to be ‘readily accessible’, namely that there are ‘fully independent 
mechanisms to which all persons can bring their allegations [of torture and ill-treatment]’.51 
 
The European Court has found that victims’ families have not been able to participate 
sufficiently in investigations, where, for example, there was no legal aid and there were 
restrictions on the extent of the disclosure of case documents in an inquest,52 or where the 
authorities failed to advise a family about the date of an inquest.53 
 
B. Triggering moment 
 
At what point will the obligation to investigate come into existence? For the European Court, the 
principle is that the duty to investigate will arise ‘where lives have been lost in circumstances 
potentially engaging the responsibility of the State’.54 There are particular situations which will 
clearly trigger the obligation. For example, this will be the case when individuals have been 
killed as a result of the use of force,55 in cases of ‘disappearances’ in circumstances which may 
be regarded as life-threatening,56 and for deaths in custody.57 The duty arises, of course, 
whether or not state agents are implicated. Therefore, ‘the mere fact the authorities were 
informed’ of a murder will give rise to an obligation to investigate the circumstances surrounding 
                                                          
49 See section 5 of this article. 
50 Inter-American Court, Valle Jaramillo et al. v Colombia, Merits, reparations and costs, Judgment of 7 
July 2009, Series C 192 (2008), para 233. 
51 Robben Island Guidelines, supra n 10, article 17. 
52 European Court, Hugh Jordan v UK, supra n 6, paras 132-140. 
53 European Court, Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, Application No 25965/04, Judgment, 7 January 2010, 
para 239.  
54 European Court, Trubnikov v Russia, Application No 49790/99, Judgment, 5 July 2005, para 85. 
55 European Court, Nachova and others v Bulgaria, Applications Nos 43577/98 and 43579/98, Judgment, 
6 July 2005, para 110. 
56 European Court, Er and others v Turkey, Application No 23016/04, Judgment, 31 July 2012, para 82. 
57 European Court, Paul and Audrey Edwards v UK, Application No 46477/99, Judgment, 14 March 2002, 
para 74. 
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the death.58 This is justified on the basis, in the case of homicide, ‘not only because any 
allegations of such an offence normally give rise to criminal liability, but also because often, in 
practice, the true circumstances of the death are, or may be, largely confined within the 
knowledge of State officials or authorities’.59  
 
The Inter-American Court has not expressly indicated the triggering moment as regards the 
obligation to investigate violations of the right to life, although it has done so for torture cases.60 
This is because it has been a common feature of right to life cases that an investigation is 
formally opened, but that there is then undue delay or the authorities fail to meet the due 
diligence requirements. In Cotton Field v Mexico, for example, concerning the disappearance 
and killing of a woman and two girls, after the next of kin of the victims informed the authorities 
that their relatives were missing, an investigation was opened, but it proved to be only a 
formality: ‘during the first 72 hours, the authorities merely registered the disappearances and the 
statements of those who reported them […].’ Therefore, ‘apart from the formal routine 
procedures, the State did not submit any arguments or evidence about measures taken in the 
said period to mobilize its investigative mechanisms in a real and effective search for the 
victims.’61 The African System has not provided express comment on this point, however, from 
the case law of the three regional systems it is possible to conclude that once State authorities 
know of a possible violation of the right to life they should open an investigation. 
 
 
C. Differences in investigatory standards relating to systemic and isolated 
violations 
 
In cases where gross and systematic human rights violations are at stake, the Inter-American 
Court has indicated that the standard of due diligence is higher than that applied in isolated 
cases. Thus, the Inter-American Court requires the State to ‘determine by means of legal 
proceedings the patterns of joint actions’ including all those involved and their levels of 
                                                          
58 European Court, Tanrikulu v Turkey, Application No 23763/94, Judgment, 8 July 1999, para 103. 
59 European Court, Trubnikov v Russia, Application No 49790/99, Judgment, 5 July 2005, para 87. 
60 Inter-American Court, Leopoldo Garcia Lucero and others v Chile, Preliminary objection, merits and 
reparations, Judgment of 28 August 2013, Series C 267 (2013), paras 124-127. 
61 Inter-American Court, González et al (Cotton Field) v Mexico, Preliminary objections, merits, 
reparations and costs, Judgment of 16 November 2009, Series C 205 (2009), para 180. 
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responsibility,62 and to ensure that the authorities ‘assess the systematic patterns that allowed 
grave human rights violations’ to happen. Such investigations should take ‘into account the 
complexity of this type of facts and of the structure in which the facts took place, thus avoiding 
omissions in the collection of evidence and in following up on logical lines of investigation’.63 
The European Court does not, as such, impose a higher standard of investigations in systemic 
cases, but the failure of the investigating authorities to make links between factually similar 
cases, and to co-ordinate their efforts, will be a relevant factor in deciding whether the obligation 
to carry out an effective investigation has been breached.64 
 
The African Commission has not clarified if the standard is different in such instances although, 
as will be seen below, it does not require the complainant to exhaust domestic remedies if there 
is prima facie evidence of ‘serious or massive violations’.  
 
D. Differences in investigatory standards relating to right to life and 
disappearance cases 
 
The Inter-American Court has maintained that the nature of an enforced disappearance must 
shape the way the duty of due diligence is fulfilled by state authorities. So, it is not that the 
standard is applied differently, as such, but it is that the very nature of an enforced 
disappearance necessarily impacts upon the way the obligation to investigate is met by state 
authorities. The Court has stipulated that the state apparatus should take prompt and immediate 
action to ascertain the whereabouts of the victim as soon as it has been notified that a person 
has disappeared.65  
 
Disappearance cases are frequently characterized by the considerable passage of time since 
the person was last seen. This may make it difficult to locate eye-witness evidence or to identify 
and mount a case against the alleged perpetrators. However, the European Court has 
                                                          
62 Inter-American Court, Río Negro Massacres v Guatemala, Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and 
costs, Judgment of 4 September 2012, Series C 250 (2012), para 194. 
63 Ibid. 
64 European Court, Ülkü Ekinci v Turkey, Application No 27602/95, Judgment, 16 July 2002, para 145; 
Magomadov and Magomadov v Russia, Application No 68004/01, Judgment, 12 July 2007, para 108; 
Makhauri v Russia, No Application 58701/00, Judgment, 4 October 2007, para 109 (the failure ‘to 
establish a comprehensive picture of events’). 
65 Inter-American Court, Contreras et al v El Salvador, Merits, reparations and costs, Judgment of 31 
August 2011, Series C 232 (2011), para 145. 
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emphasized that, even in such a situation, the ambit of the procedural obligation is 
unambiguous.66 The European Court also recognises that there is a consensus in international 
law that it should be possible to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes such as disappearances 
even many years after the events.67 
 
The Inter-American Court has laid down that acting in a timely manner includes having 
unrestricted access to places of detention and their documentation, the ability to cross-examine 
witnesses, as well as the judiciary and/or the prosecutor’s office taking all the necessary 
measures to establish the whereabouts of the person.68 The Inter-American Court has also held 
that for the authorities to be able to carry out their work adequately, they must be provided with 
‘the logistical and scientific resources necessary for the gathering and processing of the 
evidence and, specifically, of the powers to access the appropriate documents and information 
for the investigation of the facts denounced and obtain indicia or evidence of the location of the 
victims.’69 Although the African Commission has drawn upon Inter-American Court 
jurisprudence in the context of disappearances, it has been less explicit in identifying whether 
the obligation to investigate is different in such contexts.70 
 
For the European Court, the procedural obligation to investigate will arise where there is an 
arguable claim that an individual, who was last seen in the custody of agents of the State, 
subsequently disappeared in a context which may be considered life-threatening.71 Unlike an 
investigation into a killing, an investigation into a disappearance does not serve the sole 
purpose of establishing the circumstances and finding and punishing the perpetrator. The 
crucial difference in investigations into disappearances is that, by conducting an investigation, 
the authorities also aim to find the missing person or find out what happened to him or her.72 
Therefore, the obligation to investigate in the case of a disappearance will persist as long as the 
                                                          
66 European Court, Varnava and Others v Turkey, Application No 16064/90, 18 September 2009, Judgment, 
para 191. 
67 European Court, Er and Others v. Turkey, supra n 56, para 57; European Court, Aslakhanova v Russia, 
supra n 34, para 214. 
68 Inter-American Court, Anzualdo Castro v Peru, Preliminary exceptions, merits, reparations and costs, 
Judgment of 22 September 2009, Series C 202 (2009), para 135; Radilla Pacheco v Mexico, supra n 44, 
para 215. 
69 Ibid, Radilla Pacheco v Mexico, para 222. 
70 African Commission, 361/08, J.E Zitha & P.J.L.Zitha (represented by Prof. Dr. Liesbeth Zegveld) v 
Mozambique, 1 April 2011, para 80, drawing upon Moiwana Village v Suriname, Ovelario Tames v Brazil, 
and Blake v Guatemala. 
71 European Court, Cyprus v Turkey, Application No 25781/94, Judgment, 10 May 2001, para 132. 
72 European Court, Er and others v Turkey, supra n 56, para 56 
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fate of the person is unaccounted for. The ongoing failure to provide the requisite investigation 
will be regarded as a continuing violation for all three of the regional systems.73 
 
E. Differences in investigatory standards where there is evidence of discrimination 
 
Where other, potentially important factors are evident, such as discriminatory attitudes, the standards 
applicable to the obligation to carry out an effective investigation may also differ. For example, stricter 
obligations will arise in investigating racist violence under the European Convention,74 or discrimination 
that involves violence against women under the American Convention and the Inter-American Convention 
on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women.75 The African Commission 
has not yet been called upon to consider these issues. 
3. Barriers to carrying out effective investigations 
Impunity, de jure or de facto, has been a barrier to ensure that states in Europe,76 Africa and the 
Americas carry out their duty to investigate human rights violations. Impunity has been 
particularly pervasive in the latter two regions due to the presence of armed conflicts or 
dictatorships, the absence of the rule of law, corruption, the over-riding need to achieve peace 
and reconciliation and configurations of power that make it extremely difficult to investigate large 
scale human rights violations. In the three regions, States have invoked amnesty laws, statutes 
of limitation, the principle of ne bis in idem and other similar legal institutions, the effects of 
which have been to prevent or hinder investigations.  
Therefore all three regional systems have consistently maintained that amnesty laws and 
statutes of limitation are incompatible with the respective treaties. For example, this is illustrated 
most clearly by the Barrios Altos v. Peru judgment of the Inter-American Court in 2001:  
‘…all amnesty provisions, provisions on prescription and the establishment of measures 
designed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent 
                                                          
73 European Court, Varnava and Others, supra n 66, para 148; European Court, Aslakhanova v Russia, 
supra n 34, para 214; African Commission, J.E Zitha & P.J.L.Zitha (represented by Prof. Dr. Liesbeth 
Zegveld) v Mozambique, supra n 70, para 80; Inter-American Court, Anzualdo v Peru, supra n 68, para 59. 
74 European Court, Nachova and others v Bulgaria, Applications Nos 43577/98 and 43579/98, Judgment, 
26 February 2004, para 157 (endorsed by the Grand Chamber in its judgment of 6 July 2005, para 160). 
See also European Court, Menson and others v UK, Application No 47916/99, Decision, 6 May 2003; 
European Court, Angelova and Iliev v Bulgaria, Application No 55523/00, Judgment, 26 July 2007; 
European Court, Antayev and others v Russia, Application No 37966/07, Judgment, 3 July 2014, para 110. 
As to the application of these principles vis-à-vis Article 3, see European Court, Bekos and Koutropoulos v 
Greece, Application No 15250/02, Judgment, 13 December 2005. 
75 Inter-American Court, Cotton Field v Mexico, supra n 61, para 293. 
76 European Court, Abdülsamet Yaman v Turkey, Application No 32446/96, Judgment, 2 November 2004, 
para 55; European Court, Okkalı v Turkey, Application No 52067/99, Judgment, 17 October 2006, para 
76. 
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the investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations 
such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and forced disappearance, all of 
them prohibited because they violate non-derogable rights recognized by international human 
rights law’77 
The African Commission (and the European Court holding similarly78) has taken note of 
‘consistent international jurisprudence suggesting that the prohibition of amnesties leading to 
impunity for serious human rights has become a rule of customary international law,’79 referring 
to the Principles on Impunity, the jurisprudence and general comments of the Human Rights 
Committee, its own jurisprudence and that of the ICTY.   
4. Admissibility and burden of proof 
A. Jurisdiction ratione temporis 
Many gross human rights violations that have been perpetrated in the Americas region took 
place before the State in question had ratified the American Convention (Argentina80 or Chile,81 
for example) or, at a time when the State had ratified the Convention but had not accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court (as in the case of Guatemala82). The Court has 
acknowledged that it cannot exercise jurisdiction over matters that took place before the state in 
question ratified the Convention and accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, however, it does 
exercise jurisdiction over incidents which originally took place before the date of ratification, but 
whose effects continued after that date, as, for example, in the case of enforced 
disappearances.83 The African Commission has held similarly, distinguishing between 
                                                          
77 Inter-American Court, Barrios Altos v Peru, Merits, Judgment of 14 March 2001, Series C 75, para 41. 
78 European Court, Marguš v Croatia, Application No 4455/10, Judgment, 27 May 2014, paras 129-141.  
79 African Commission, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, supra n 2, para 201. 
80 Argentina ratified the American Convention and recognised the jurisdiction of the Court on 14 August 
1984.  
81 Chile ratified the Convention and accepted the jurisdiction of the Court on 10 August 1990. 
82 Guatemala ratified the American Convention on 27 April 1978 and accepted the jurisdiction of the Court 
on 9 March 1987. 
83 See, for example, Inter-American Court, Blake v Guatemala, Preliminary exceptions, Judgment of 2 July 
1996, Series C 27, para 39; Inter-American Court, Serrano Cruz Sisters v El Salvador, Preliminary 
objections, Judgment of 23 November 2004, Series C 118 (2004), paras 65 and 66; Inter-American Court, 
Heliodoro Portugal v Panama, Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, Judgment of 12 August 
2008, Series C 186 (2008), para 25, and Inter-American Court, Río Negro Massacres v Guatemala, supra 
n 62, para 37. In Serrano Cruz Sisters, the Inter-American Court made reference to Article 28 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 which states as follows: ‘Unless a different intention appears from 
the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which 
took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with 
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continuing violations and an ‘instantaneous act’, holding disappearances to be the former as a 
‘violation that occurs and continues over time, until it ceases, that is, until the missing person is 
no longer disappeared’.84 In the case of the Beneficiaries of the Late Norbert Zongo and others 
v. Burkina Faso,85 the African Court drew a distinction between the fact of an assassination, in 
1998, of a journalist and several of his companions (an instantaneous act), and the subsequent 
failure to investigate the case. The duty to investigate continued after the date when Burkina 
Faso accepted the jurisdiction of the Court (January 2004) and accordingly the Court had 
jurisdiction ratione temporis to consider it. 
The Inter-American Court too has maintained that it can exercise jurisdiction over separate and 
independent violations related to the failure of the state to conduct an impartial and effective 
investigation.86 
The European Court has also found that the procedural obligation to investigate fatalities is a 
separate and autonomous duty – and, therefore, one that is, in the words of the Strasbourg 
Court, ‘detachable’ and capable of binding the State even when the death took place before the 
critical date. In reaching this finding in Šilih v Slovenia,87 in 2009, the Grand Chamber reviewed 
the application of the ratione temporis principle in international law, including the relevant case 
law of the United Nations Human Rights Committee88 and particularly that of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights.  
                                                          
regard to that party’. The European Court has also drawn a clear distinction, as regards the ratione temporis 
principle, as between killings and disappearances, the latter giving rise to a continuing procedural obligation 
to investigate that will persist as long as the victim’s fate remains unaccounted for. See European Court, 
Varnava and Others v Turkey, supra n 66, para 148. 
84 Also in the context of enforced disappearances, see African Commission, JE Zitha and PJL Zitha 
(represented by Prof Dr Liesbeth Zegveld) v Mozambique, supra n 70, para 93. 
85 African Court, Beneficiaries of the Late Norbert Zongo and others v. Burkina Faso, No 13/2011, 
Judgment,28 March 2014. 
86 Inter-American Court, Almonacid Arellano et al v Chile, Preliminary exception, merits, reparations and 
costs, Judgment of 26 September 2006, Series C 154 (2006), paras 47 to 49. The Court listed a series of 
examples of such violations which had arisen in previous cases: ‘the decision of a judge not to allow the 
counsel for the defense to participate in the proceeding; the prohibition imposed on the counsels for the 
defense to interview their clients in private, to duly examine the record of the case, to forward evidence for 
the defense, to challenge incriminating evidence, and to prepare the arguments in due time; the intervention 
of ‘faceless’ judges and prosecutors; the torture or ill-treatment inflicted on the defendant to exact a 
confession from him; the failure to inform foreign detainees of their right to have consular assistance; and 
the violation of the principle of coherence or correlation between the charges and the judgment’. 
87 European Court, Šilih v. Slovenia, Application No 71463/01, Judgment, 9 April 2009. See also European 
Court, Varnava and Others v Turkey, supra n 66, para 147. 
88 The Human Rights Committee’s assessment of the effectiveness of an investigation into a fatality is not 
limited to the right to life (Article 6 ICCPR), but also encompasses the right to an effective remedy (Article 
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However, the European Court has been required to delve further into this issue, and has 
concluded that, in view of the principle of legal certainty, its temporal jurisdiction as regards the 
duty to investigate cannot be considered to be open-ended: there must therefore be a ‘genuine 
connection’ between the death and the entry into force of the Convention in respect of the 
respondent State for the procedural obligations imposed by the right to life (Article 2) to come 
into effect. This means that a ‘significant proportion’ of the procedural steps should usually have 
taken place after the entry into force of the Convention, although the Court accepted that ‘in 
certain circumstances the connection could also be based on the need to ensure that the 
guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention are protected in a real and effective 
manner’ (the ‘Convention values test’).89 In the subsequent case of Janowiec and others v 
Russia, concerning the execution in 1940 of more than 21,000 Polish prisoners of war by the 
                                                          
2 ICCPR) and also the prohibition of inhuman treatment (Article 7 ICCPR). However, under the Covenant 
the right to an effective remedy can only be breached in conjunction with another substantive right, so if a 
death occurs outside the Human Rights Committee’s temporal jurisdiction, there cannot be a breach of 
the right to an effective remedy (Article 2) in conjunction with the right to life (Article 6). See: Human 
Rights Committee, S.E. v. Argentina (275/1988), Admissibility, CCPR/C/38/D/275/1988 (1990). In that 
case, the applicant’s three children had been abducted by Argentine security forces in 1976, but the 
Covenant and Optional Protocol only entered into force in respect of Argentina in 1986. See also: Human 
Rights Committee, Maria Otilia Vargas v. Chile (represented by Fundación de Ayuda Social de las 
Inglesias Cristianas) (718/1996), Admissibility, CCPR/C/66/D/718/1996/Rev. 1 (1999); Human Rights 
Committee, Norma Yurich v. Chile (1078/2002), Admissibility, CCPR/C/85/D/1078/2002 (2005). In the 
case of Human Rights Committee, Mariam Sankara et al. v. Burkina Faso (1159/2003), Admissibility, 
CCPR/C/86/D/1159/2003 (2006), the Human Rights Committee found it had jurisdiction ratione 
temporis in relation to the investigation into the disappearance of Thomas Sankara, who had been 
abducted and murdered in 1987, prior to Burkina Faso becoming a party to the Optional Protocol in 1999. 
The Human Rights Committee declared admissible the complaints brought by Mr Sankara’s widow and 
children arising from the failure to conduct an inquiry and prosecute the guilty parties, ultimately finding a 
violation of Article 7 (the prohibition of inhuman treatment), recognising the suffering experienced by his 
relatives (as well as a violation of Article 14 (the right to equality)). The European Court has found that the 
anguish and distress caused by the disappearance of a close relative may give rise to a violation of the 
prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 3 ECHR), reflecting the reactions and attitudes of 
the authorities once a particular situation has been brought to their attention (see, e.g., European Court, 
Varnava and Others v Turkey, supra n 66, para 200). 
See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), para 15, which states, inter 
alia that ‘a failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of violations could in and of itself give rise to a 
separate breach of the Covenant’. 
89 European Court, Šilih v Slovenia, supra n 86, para 163. Note, however, the extent of dissension to these 
tests as expressed in the various concurring and dissenting opinions to the Šilih judgment. For a ‘genuine 
connection’ to be established, both criteria must be satisfied: the period of time between the death as the 
triggering event and the entry into force of the Convention must have been reasonably short, and a major 
part of the investigation must have been carried out, or ought to have been carried out, after the entry into 
force (European Court, Janowiec and others v Russia, Applications Nos 55508/07 and 29520/09, 
Judgment, 21 October 2013, para 148).  
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Soviet Union (the Katyn massacre), the majority of the grand chamber further defined these 
conditions:  
‘a required connection may be found to exist if the triggering event was of a larger 
dimension than an ordinary criminal offence and amounted to the negation of the very 
foundations of the Convention. This would be the case with serious crimes under 
international law, such as war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity, in 
accordance with the definitions given to them in the relevant international instruments’.90 
Applying the Šilih criteria, the majority of the grand chamber in Janowiec found that it could not 
examine the complaints about the failure to carry out an effective investigation, because of the 
ratione temporis principle, noting that Russia had ratified the Convention 58 years after the 
Katyn massacre, which took place more than ten years before the Convention itself came into 
existence. However, four dissenting judges91 argued that as the killings of the Polish prisoners 
were war crimes, the Court should have distinguished the case and found a violation of the right 
to life. The dissenters objected to the majority’s narrow interpretation as to which ‘procedural 
acts’ are covered by the investigative obligation – those limited to the particular interests of the 
injured party and excluding other broader types of inquiry, such as those seeking to establish a 
historical truth. What was more significant for the dissenters was the clear trend in international 
law towards the recognition of a right to truth in gross violation cases (relying, inter alia, on the 
case-law of the Human Rights Committee).92 Furthermore, in the dissenters’ view, the majority 
erred in finding that the Convention values test could not be applied to events pre-dating the 
adoption of the Convention, a principle which they argued to be inconsistent with international 
law.93 Accordingly, the dissenting judges concluded that in view of the gravity and magnitude of 
the war crimes in question, considered together with the actions of the Russian authorities after 
the entry into force of the Convention, the Court should have acknowledged its jurisdiction in the 
case. 
                                                          
90 European Court, Janowiec and others v Russia, ibid, para 150. However the ‘Convention values’ clause 
cannot be applied to events which occurred prior to the adoption of the Convention, on 4 November 1950: 
Janowiec, para 151. As with the Šilih case, the various concurring and dissenting opinions to the Janowiec 
judgment reflect considerable disagreement with the majority’s application of the ratione temporis principle.  
91 Judges Ziemele, de Gaetano, Laffranque and Keller. 
92 Human Rights Committee, Mariam, Philippe, Auguste and Thomas Sankara v. Burkina-Faso 
(1159/2003), Views, CCPR/C/86/D/1159/2003 (2006), para 12.2; Human Rights Committee, Schedko and 
Bondarenko v. Belarus (886/1999), Views, CCPR/C/77/D/886/1999 (1999), para 10.2 
93 The dissenting judges in Janowiec also referred to the Convention values test as the ‘humanitarian 
clause’. 
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B. Exhaustion of domestic remedies and related temporal rules on 
submission of applications 
There have been close parallels in the development of the exhaustion of domestic remedies 
criterion within the three regional mechanisms, all of which require an assessment of the 
availability, sufficiency and effectiveness of any domestic remedies on which a respondent 
Government seeks to rely.94 Only the American Convention includes (in Article 46(2)) detailed 
explicit exceptions to the exhaustion rule where: a) the domestic legislation does not provide 
due process of law for the protection of the right that has allegedly been violated; b) the 
applicant has been denied access to the remedies under domestic law or has been prevented 
from exhausting them; or c) there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment.95  
In all three systems, the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies may not be applicable when 
human rights violations have been committed as part of a systemic or generalised practice, or 
where, as in the case of the African Commission, there is evidence of serious or massive 
violations. In Velásquez Rodríguez the Inter-American Court found that the obligation to exhaust 
domestic remedies is discharged ‘if there is proof of the existence of a practice or policy ordered 
or tolerated by the government’, the effect of which is to prevent normal recourse to such 
remedies.96 The Court concluded in the same case that as regards cases of disappearances in 
Honduras in the early 1980s, any remedies which theoretically may have been available were in 
fact ineffective as the imprisonments were clandestine, formal requirements made them 
inapplicable in practice, complaints were simply ignored by the authorities, or the authorities 
threatened and intimidated the lawyers and judges involved. Such evidence was provided by 
the Commission, which was able to show that habeas corpus and criminal complaints were 
ineffective.97 In a similar vein, the European Court has found that applicants may be absolved 
from exhausting domestic remedies if there are ‘special circumstances’, for example, where ‘the 
national authorities [remain] totally passive in the face of serious allegations of misconduct or 
                                                          
94 See, for example Inter-American Court, Garibaldi v Brazil, Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and 
costs, Judgment of 23 September 2009, Series C 203 (2009), para 46; African Commission, 275/03, Article 
19 v State of Eritrea (2007), para 74; European Court, Demopoulos and Others v Turkey, Applications Nos 
46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03, 10200/04, 14163/04, 19993/04, 21819/04, Decision, 1 March 
2010, para 70. 
95 Article 50 of the African Charter also excludes from the exhaustion requirement remedies that are ‘unduly 
prolonged’. 
96 Inter-American Court, Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Preliminary objections, Judgment of 26 June 
1987, Series C 1 (1987), para 68. 
97 Inter-American Court, Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, Merits, supra n 1, paras 80-81. 
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infliction of harm by State agents, for example where they have failed to undertake 
investigations or offer assistance’.98 
A link between the failure to investigate and the question of the assessment of the effectiveness 
of domestic remedies has also been made by the African Commission. In Article 19 v Eritrea, 
which concerned the incommunicado detention of journalists in the early 2000s, the 
Commission found that: 
‘Holding the victims incommunicado for over three years demonstrates a prima facie 
violation of due process of the law and in particular, Article 7 of the African Charter. By 
not taking any action to remedy the situation more than twelve months after the African 
Commission had been seized of the communication goes to demonstrate that the State 
has equally failed to demonstrate that domestic remedies are available and effective’.99 
The African Commission has also held that in the case of ‘massive violations’,100 their 
pervasiveness means that the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies will not be applied, 
‘especially where the state took no steps to prevent or stop them’.101 In the case of Anuak 
Justice Council v Ethiopia, which concerned an alleged massacre of more than 400 members of 
the Anuak people (an indigenous minority group living in the south-western region of Ethiopia), 
the African Commission found that the state’s response had been acceptable, in that it had 
established a commission of inquiry and alleged perpetrators had been indicted.102 
 
Within the European system, there has been a more restrictive application in recent years of the 
rules relating to the timing of submissions of applications to the European Court, in the particular 
context of disappearance cases.103 For some years, the European Court expected applicants in 
                                                          
98 European Court, Cyprus v Turkey, supra n 71, para 116. 
99 African Commission, Article 19 v Eritrea, supra n 93, para 76. 
100 See Article 58 of the African Charter. 
101 African Commission, 299/05, Anuak Justice Council v Ethiopia (2006), para 60. 
102 Ibid, para 61. 
103 Both the European and Inter-American systems require applications to be lodged within 6 months of the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies, whereas the African Charter stipulates that petitions should be submitted 
within a ‘reasonable time’ after exhausting local remedies (Article 56(6) of the African Charter; cf Article 
35(1) of the European Convention and Article 46(1)(b) of the American Convention). Nevertheless, with 
reference to the other two regional systems, the African Commission has applied a six months time limit in 
some cases: see, e.g., African Commission, 308/05, Michael Majuru v Zimbabwe (2008), para 109. This 
practice of the African Commission’s has been criticised by Frans Viljoen as representing a ‘strikingly 
inappropriate reliance on international law, which is a-contextual and loses sight of the purpose of the open-
ended formulation in the Charter’ (F. Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 
OUP, 2012), 320). 
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cases concerning deaths or disappearances to keep track of the progress of domestic 
investigations and to lodge their applications ‘with due expedition’ once they become aware (or 
should become aware) of the lack of an effective investigation.104 Although it had been the 
European Court’s practice not to apply the six months rule to cases of disappearance, on the 
basis that the time limit could not run in respect of continuing violations, in 2009 the grand 
chamber in Varnava and Others v Turkey found that there was an obligation on the relatives of 
the disappeared to act with the necessary expedition in order to avoid, for example, loss of 
evidence or witnesses being untraceable. Applicants must therefore ‘make proof of a certain 
amount of diligence and initiative and introduce their complaints without undue delay’.105 
The European Court in Varnava took pains to acknowledge the uncertainty and confusion which 
frequently follows a disappearance case, and noted the consensus in international law that it 
should be possible to prosecute such serious cases many years later,106 but it nevertheless 
concluded that applications in disappearance cases could be rejected as being out of time 
where there has been an excessive or unexplained delay by the applicants, after they became 
aware (or should have become aware) of the ineffectiveness of the domestic investigation, and 
where there is no immediate, realistic prospect of an effective investigation being provided in the 
future. The Court went on to stipulate that applications in complex disappearance cases should 
therefore be brought within ‘several years’ of the incident; a delay of ten years would require 
particular justification.107 
The approach of the Inter-American Commission has been different to that followed by the 
European Court in Varnava. A petition must be filed with the Commission within a reasonable 
period of time if the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies does not apply. The Rules of 
Procedure of the Commission indicate that this must be determined by the Commission taking 
into account ‘the date of the alleged violation and the circumstances of each case’. The 
Commission, in application of this rule, has been flexible in its treatment of disappearance 
cases. For example, in the case of Octavio Rubén González Acosta v. Paraguay, who 
disappeared in December 1975, the petition was brought before the Commission in June 1999 
and the Commission considered that it had been presented within a reasonable period of time 
                                                          
104 European Court, Varnava and Others v Turkey, supra n 66, para 158. 
105 Ibid, para 161. 
106 The Court cited the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
107 On the ten year ‘limit’, see the dissenting opinion of Judge Sajó in European Court, Er and Others v 
Turkey, supra n 56. 
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‘taking into account the date of the alleged violations, the possible existence of a situation of 
continuing violation of human rights, and the status of the various domestic remedies in 
Paraguay.’108 
C. Burden of proof 
Since its very first judgment, Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, in 1988, the Inter-American 
Court has imposed an obligation on state authorities to produce information and evidence in 
circumstances where the applicants are simply unable to do so, noting that disappearances are 
‘characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the kidnapping or the 
whereabouts and fate of the victim’.109 Thus the Court has emphasised that ‘the State cannot 
rely on the defense that the complainant has failed to present evidence when it cannot be 
obtained without the State's cooperation’.110 
Similarly, according to the jurisprudence of the European Court, the general position is that 
while the applicant bears the burden of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt, the burden 
will be shifted back to the government where the events in question fall largely within the 
‘exclusive knowledge’ of the authorities, as is the case, for example, where a detainee dies 
whilst in state custody or in respect of any person who is found dead or injured, or who has 
disappeared, in an area which is under the state’s exclusive control.111 In such cases the 
authorities will bear the burden of providing a ‘satisfactory and convincing explanation’.112 The 
Court is also entitled to draw strong inferences from the non-disclosure of crucial documents.113 
Although in many of the African Commission’s decisions the evidential basis for its findings is 
arguably unclear,114 one can glean some general approaches. The applicant will need to submit 
a prima facie case to pass the admissibility requirements in Article 56 of the Charter. Although 
the applicant will have the burden of proving the allegations as part of the merits of the case, the 
response of the government and willingness to engage with the Commission will determine the 
extent of this burden. A ‘blanket denial of responsibility’ from the state will result in the 
                                                          
108 Inter-American Commission, Case 12.358, Octavio Rubén González Acosta v Paraguay, Report No 
83/03 (2003). 
109 Inter-American Court, Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, supra n 1, para 131. 
110 Ibid, para 135. 
111 European Court, Varnava and Others v Turkey, supra n 66, para 184. 
112 European Court, Salman v Turkey, Application No 21896/93, Judgment, 27 June 2000, para 100. 
113 European Court, Magomed Musayev and Others v Russia, Application No 8979/02, Judgment, 23 
October 2008, para 85. 
114 Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, 2nd ed. (Oxford, OUP, 2012), 322. 
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Commission deciding the case on the basis of the facts presented by the applicant.115 Although 
the African Commission has not always been consistent on this question, it has held that once 
the state contradicts the applicant, the burden of proof will shift to it.116 
5. Relationship between the duty to investigate and the right to know the truth 
While the three regional systems recognise that there is a right to know the truth under 
international law, its treatment differs in part because of the varying socio-political contexts 
which shape the way they understand the right. The right to know the truth has been a pivotal 
element in the various transitional justice processes that have taken place in the Americas and 
Africa as illustrated by the cases of Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, South Africa and Kenya, 
although in many cases such mechanisms have arguably been used to avoid dealing with 
criminal investigations (i.e. ‘truth instead of justice’). In European states, in contrast, with the 
exception of the various measures taken following World War II, the right to know the truth has 
not been given the same degree of attention, even though victims continue to claim it. An 
illustration of this is the case of Spain where years after Franco’s dictatorship, state authorities 
continue to deny the fulfilment of this right. Indeed, in a recent visit to that country by Pablo de 
Greiff, the Special Rapporteur on Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-recurrence, 
concluded that in Spain “[t]he most serious shortcomings are to be found in the spheres of truth 
and justice. No State policy was ever established with respect to truth; there is no official 
information and no mechanisms for elucidating the truth”.117 A similar situation can be said to be 
taking place in Russia as illustrated by the Janowiec and others case v. Russia, which is 
discussed below.   
The Inter-American and European Courts both recognise that victims, their next of kin and 
society as a whole have the right to know the truth about what happened. However, the two 
systems differ in their understanding of the relationship of the duty to investigate and the right to 
know the truth. For the Inter-American Court, the right to know the truth ‘is subsumed in the right 
                                                          
115 African Commission, 74/92, Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme v Chad, 11 October 1995, 
paras 19 and 24. This was reaffirmed in African Commission, 27/89, 46/91, 49/91 and 99/93, 
Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture and Association Internationale des Juristes Democrates, 
Commission Internationale des Juristes (CIJ), Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme v. Rwanda 
(1996), para 20. See also African Commission, 143/95 and 150/96, Constitutional Rights Project and Civil 
Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria (1999), para 28. 
116 African Commission, 71/92, Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des droits de l’homme (RADDHO) v 
Zambia (1997), para 27. 
117 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of non-repetition: 
Mission to Spain, A/HRC/27/56/Add.1, 22 July 2014, p. 1. 
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of the victim or his next of kin to obtain clarification of the facts relating to the violations and the 
corresponding responsibilities from the competent State organs, through the investigation and 
prosecution established in Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention.’118 While more recently the Inter-
American Court has been ready to concede that the right to know the truth can also involve 
other rights under the Convention such as the right of access to information under Article 13, 
there is an intimate relationship between the right to know the truth and the duty to investigate. 
Consequently, the Court has held that the establishment of a truth commission, as valuable as it 
may be, is not sufficient to fulfil the obligation to investigate or the victim’s right to know the 
truth. The State will still have an obligation to ‘open and expedite criminal investigations to 
determine the corresponding responsibilities.’119 
In contrast, the European Court has maintained that the duty to investigate and the right to know 
the truth are different. In the Janowiec v. Russia case, relating to the Katyn massacre (see 
section 4A above), the Court said that it ‘considers that the reference to ‘procedural acts’ must 
be understood in the sense inherent in the procedural obligation under Article 2 or, as the case 
may be, Article 3 of the Convention, namely acts undertaken in the framework of criminal, civil, 
administrative or disciplinary proceedings which are capable of leading to the identification and 
punishment of those responsible or to an award of compensation to the injured party […]. This 
definition operates to the exclusion of other types of inquiries that may be carried out for other 
purposes, such as establishing a historical truth.’120  
The consequences of this approach are not without importance. For example, if the European 
Court decides that it has jurisdiction ratione temporis (see section 4A above) over the obligation 
to investigate, this would not necessarily include the right to know the truth, at least not in 
relation to establishing the truth outside legal proceedings. The Inter-American Court, however, 
would look at the wider dimensions of the right to know the truth when considering the obligation 
to investigate. 
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There are signs, however, that the European Court may be willing to broaden its outlook. In the 
El-Masri case, concerning the phenomenon of ‘extraordinary rendition’, the Court explicitly 
recognised the negative impact that an inadequate investigation can have on the right to know 
the truth (not only of other victims of rendition, but also of the general public) and stated that an 
adequate investigation should lead both to the identification of the perpetrators and to 
establishing the truth of what happened.121 
Despite the establishment of truth and reconciliation bodies in a number of African states (South 
Africa, Liberia and Kenya, for example), and although the African Commission has recognised 
the right to know the truth, it has not defined its scope or reach in its communications. What it 
has done, however, is to require that there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny not 
only of the investigation but also of its results122 to secure accountability in practice as well as in 
theory.123 The degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case.  
 
6. Reparations  
 
The Inter-American Court and the African Commission share an expansive approach to the 
question of reparations. As regards cases of disappearances and extra-judicial executions, the 
Inter-American Court has frequently ordered the state to carry out investigations, it has upheld 
the right of relatives (and of wider society) to be informed about what happened,124 and has 
ordered states to locate the remains of victims and provide them to the next-of-kin.125 It has 
justified its position by explicitly finding that the nature and gravity of cases of gross violations of 
human rights may require more than a declaratory response.126 
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It is important to note that the Inter-American Court does not distinguish between violations 
when awarding reparation; in other words, it will not indicate that the reparations awarded 
correspond to the violation of specific rights. However, a careful analysis of the grounds and 
evidence on which the Court makes such awards can establish a link between a particular 
reparations order and the duty to investigate. For example, a frequently awarded form of 
reparation by the Inter-American Court in right to life cases is the requirement for the publication 
of the judgment.127 This can be considered to provide redress for a lack of due diligence in 
investigations, given that it enables others to know what were the particular failings in the 
investigation. The Court has also ordered that prosecutors, judges and members of the military 
or security forces, or other state institutions, be provided with training in particular areas of 
international human rights law and humanitarian law.128 The Inter-American Court has also 
recognised that the grounds for claiming moral damages include the denial of justice and the 
persistence of impunity and has accordingly awarded compensation on equitable grounds on 
that basis.129  
 
Similarly, the practice of the African Commission is to call on states to carry out investigations in 
cases of killings or disappearances.130 For example, Malawi African Association and Others v. 
Mauritania131 concerned the treatment of Black Mauritanians in the period between 1986 and 
1992, including the detention of hundreds of people, the fate of many of whom remained 
unknown. The Commission found a series of grave or massive violations of the rights in the 
Charter and accordingly required the respondent state to establish an independent enquiry ‘in 
order to clarify the fate of persons considered as disappeared, identify and bring to book the 
authors of the violations perpetrated at the time of the facts arraigned’. 
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The case of Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe concerned the political violence 
which erupted following the constitutional referendum in February 2000, prior to parliamentary 
elections held later that year. The Commission found that the majority of human rights violations 
were committed by non-state actors, however, the victims’ rights to judicial protection and to 
have their cause heard (Article 7 of the Charter) had been violated because of the passing of a 
clemency order which had the effect of prohibiting prosecutions and setting free the perpetrators 
of ‘politically-motivated crimes’. As a result, the Commission called on the Republic of 
Zimbabwe to establish a Commission of Inquiry ‘to investigate the causes of the violence…and 
bring those responsible for the violence to justice, and identify victims of the violence in order to 
provide them with just and adequate compensation’.132 
In making an order for reparations in terms of an investigation, the Inter-American Court goes 
further than simply enunciating the bare obligation; it fleshes out what it will entail in the specific 
case, in considerable detail, in order for the investigation to be effective. For example, in the 
case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v Colombia, which concerned the extra-judicial execution in 
1994 of a Senator, who was killed as part of a plan to exterminate his political party, the Patriotic 
Union, the Court found that various violations of the duty to investigate with due diligence had 
taken place and therefore required the State: to ‘investigate effectively all the facts and 
background of this case, including… all the necessary measures to detect and reveal patterns 
of systematic violence against the collectivity to which Mr. Cepeda belonged’; to identify all 
those involved; to ‘establish coordination mechanisms between the different State organs and 
institutions with powers to investigate, and other existing or future entities in order to conduct 
the most coherent and effective investigation’; to remove all obstacles to justice; to investigate 
all links between state authorities and members of paramilitary groups; to ensure that members 
of paramilitary groups who had been extradited to the US would be accessible to secure justice 
in Colombia; to ensure that those involved in the investigations as well as victims and witnesses 
had at their disposal the necessary protection mechanisms; and to ensure that the results be 
publicised.133 
                                                          
132 African Commission, 245/02, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe. See also African 
Commission, 292/2004, Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v Republic of Angola, (2008) 
in which the Commission recommended, inter alia, that the Republic of Angola should: ‘establish a 
Commission of inquiry to investigate the circumstances under which the victims were expelled and ensure 
the payment of adequate compensation of all those whose rights were violated in the process.’ A further 
example is African Commission, 204/97, Mouvement burkinabé des droits de l'Homme et des peuples v 
Burkina Faso (2001). 
133 Inter-American Court, Manuel Cepeda Vargas v Colombia, supra n 8, paras 214-218. 
27 
 
In disappearance cases or those involving massacres where victims are yet be found and 
identified, the Inter-American Court has also ordered that the effective search of the 
whereabouts of the victims should continue, stipulating detailed conditions.134 
 
In the Cotton Field case, concerning gender-based violence in Ciudad Juárez in Mexico, the 
Court not only required the respondent state to ensure the effective prosecution of such cases 
(in respect of both the perpetrators and masterminds) but also stipulated that the investigation 
must include a gender perspective and include specific lines of inquiry concerning sexual 
violence.135 The Court may also stipulate that investigators should take account of systematic 
patterns of human rights violations.136 
 
The position of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to redress for failing to carry out 
effective investigations into cases of fatalities remains considerably undeveloped, in comparison 
to the stance of both the Inter-American Court and African Commission.137 The European Court 
has developed its right to life jurisprudence notably in response to a series of cases from 
Northern Ireland, and in cases arising out of the conflicts in Turkey since the 1990s and in 
Chechnya in the 2000s. There have been multiple instances in both Turkey and Russia of cases 
of disappearances and extra-judicial killings, on which the European Court has been called to 
adjudicate. It may be that the European Court’s relatively limited and conservative approach to 
redress in such cases can be explained in part by the different contexts on which the Inter-
American and African Commission have had to rule. The European Court’s practice has been to 
reject applicants’ requests that states be ordered to carry out investigations, with the Court 
preferring to leave the respondent state to choose how to comply with its judgments, subject to 
supervision by the Committee of Ministers.138  
 
However, a number of European judges have, in more recent years, questioned whether the 
Court should not go further, especially in cases of enforced disappearance. For example, in 
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Medova v Russia in 2009, which concerned the disappearance of Adam Medov in Ingushetia in 
2004, Judge Spielmann, in his partly dissenting opinion, argued that in view of the multiple 
shortcomings in the investigation which the Court had identified, it should also have ordered the 
state to carry out effective investigation:  
 
‘…many of these shortcomings…might still be redressed in the particular circumstances 
of this case if an investigation were conducted even after so many years’.139 
 
Similar sentiments were expressed by Judges Spielmann, Ziemele and Kalaydjieva in their 
concurring opinion in Varnava and others v. Turkey, relating to the disappearance of the 
applicants’ relatives following their detention by Turkish armed forces in northern Cyprus in 
1974.140 There are clear signs too, that the nature and scale of the human rights violations 
committed in Chechnya (and other republics in the north Caucasus region of Russia) have led 
to further developments in the European Court’s thinking on redress. The case of Abuyeva and 
others v. Russia,141 concerned deaths of civilians caused by the shelling of a village in 
Chechnya in 2000 by the Russian armed forces. The Abuyeva judgment was published in 2010, 
five years after the judgment in the case of Isayeva v Russia142 relating to the very same 
incident, but in spite of the passage of time, an effective investigation had still not been carried 
out into the attack. The European Court came to the view that an effective investigation into the 
case was still possible, therefore, whilst acknowledging that Russia’s compliance with the 
judgment would be assessed by the Committee of Ministers, the Court considered it ‘inevitable 
that a new, independent, investigation should take place’.143 The Abuyeva decision was followed 
in 2012 by its judgment in Aslakhanova v Russia in which the European Court found, for the first 
time, that ineffective criminal investigations into the circumstances of disappearances in the 
North Caucasus, notably between 1999 and 2006, were widespread and systemic.144 The Court 
again found that it could not order the performance of particular measures of redress, but it 
considered itself to be  ‘compelled’ to provide ‘guidance’ on steps that were required by the 
respondent state: 
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‘Such steps should be taken with the aim of putting an end to the continued suffering of 
the relatives of the disappeared persons, conducting effective investigations into the 
cases of abduction, unlawful detention and disappearance allegedly committed by 
servicemen, and ensuring that the families of the victims are awarded adequate 
redress’.145 
 
The particular measures stipulated by the Court in Aslakhanova were the following: create a 
single, sufficiently high-level body in charge of solving disappearances in the region; compile 
and maintain a unified database of all disappearances; the allocation of specific and adequate 
resources required to carry out large-scale forensic and scientific work on the ground, including 
the location and exhumation of presumed burial sites; the collection, storage and identification 
of remains and, where necessary, systematic matching through up-to-date genetic databanks; 
the payment of financial compensation to the victims’ families; the possibility of unilateral 
remedial offers to the relatives, including an undertaking to conduct, under supervision of the 
Committee of Ministers, an ECHR-compliant investigation; and the continuing obligation to 
investigate the situations of known or presumed deaths of individuals.146 As regards the ongoing 
obligation to carry out effective investigations, the Court also underlined the need for the 
investigating authorities to identify the leading agencies and commanding officers who were 
involved in the special operations in question, and clarify who was responsible for any 
detainees, and for the investigators to have unhindered access to data held by the security 
forces.147 
 
A further development on point was taken by the European Court in its judgment relating to the 
crackdown on anti-government demonstrations in Bucharest in December 1989, around the 
time that Nicolae Ceauşescu was overthrown (Association ‘21 December 1989’ and Others v. 
Romania148). Having found that there had been widespread use of lethal force against the 
demonstrators, and that the subsequent investigation had been ineffective, because of the 
statutory limitation of criminal liability, the Court stipulated that the victims should therefore be 
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provided with an effective investigation ‘in view also of the importance to Romanian society of 
knowing the truth about the events’.149 
7. Conclusions  
Overall there is a striking similarity in the broad approach of the three regional systems in their 
interpretation and application of the duty to investigate in respect of right to life cases. Although 
the systems have employed differing wording to describe the essential nature of the duty to 
investigate (requiring either ‘due diligence’ or an ‘effective official investigation’), each identifies 
six core elements: investigate on the state’s own initiative; conduct an effective investigation; 
ensure promptness and reasonable expedition; maintain independence and impartiality; allow 
public scrutiny; and ensure the involvement of the next-of-kin. There are some differences in 
wording which do not, however, actually indicate a divergent approach (such as the Inter-
American and African requirement for a ‘serious’ investigation).  
Where some distinctions are apparent, these may in fact be more the result of lack of clarity on 
certain points (such as the burden of proof, the triggering moment, and the question whether the 
duty amounts to an obligation of result or one of means) rather than an actual difference in 
approach.  Indeed, we would suggest that this chapter highlights a number of areas where there 
is a need for greater clarity from one or more of the regional systems. For example, whereas the 
European and Inter-American Courts have stipulated that the duty extends to the prosecution 
and punishment of the perpetrators, that has yet to be clarified by the African institutions. 
Other areas of divergence arguably stem from a comparatively larger number of cases in one of 
the regional systems which raise a particular serious issue (for example disappearances), which 
coupled with rampant impunity and the repetitive failure of the State in question to implement 
the orders of the Inter-American Court, create serious reasons for concern, and which have 
therefore required the system in question to place greater focus on the point and to find ways to 
pressure the respective State to address the situation it faces. We have in mind here the way in 
which the Inter-American bodies have imposed on states stricter investigatory obligations as 
regards systemic cases, than either the African or European systems have yet had cause to do.  
Following on from this, the varied socio-political contexts of the three regional systems 
undoubtedly account for certain differences in the case-law. While all three mechanisms 
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recognise the right to know the truth, the states in the Americas turned this right into a pivotal 
element of their transitional justice processes as at the very least, repressive dictatorships in the 
region were ready to allow some truth instead of criminal accountability processes. The way 
criminal investigations were a trade-off in the region, forced the Inter-American System to take a 
stand on the issue and to establish that while the right to know the truth is a clear entitlement 
under the American Convention, it is intrinsically related to the obligation to investigate (as well 
as to other rights) so, truth without justice is not allowed under the American Convention. This 
stands in contrast with the European jurisprudence that appears to allow truth without justice if 
certain conditions are met. 
Where there are significant differences in approach, such as for the award of reparations, this 
may be attributed to a variety of factors, including the drafting histories of the respective treaties. 
For example, some commentators on the Inter-American system have alluded to the intention of 
those who were involved in drafting the American Convention to ensure that the Inter-American 
Court had broad powers to order reparations,150 whereas that was not the case as regards the 
European Court.151 The greater gravity and scale of cases before the Inter-American and 
African systems may be another reason why those systems have been prepared to take the 
issue of reparations a good deal further than the European Court.  It can also be explained if the 
human rights regional courts see their role as one of exercising corrective justice, whereby they 
not only address the violations and the harm caused by human rights abuses, but they also try 
to trigger structural changes for vulnerable communities that have been affected by them. 
As we have discussed, the European Court’s approach to redress has been developed in recent 
years, albeit more often through its use of recommendations. The Inter-American Court’s 
redress provisions are included within its operative provisions, and are therefore unquestionably 
legally binding, but that was not the case as regards the European Court’s recent stipulations in 
Abuyeva, Aslakhanova or Association ‘21 December 1989’, which therefore can only be (strictly) 
considered as ‘recommendations’. Divergent attitudes towards redress are also a consequence 
of differences in the roles that the respective treaty bodies are expected to play with respect to 
reparations and in follow up on decisions. Whereas the Inter-American bodies, and to a certain 
extent the African Commission, are more willing to specify the actions the state must take in 
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order to comply with its decision, in the European system it is the Committee of Ministers, not 
the European Court, which has the task of supervising the execution of judgments.152 This does 
not mean that the Court, as amplified by Judges Spielmann, Ziemele and Kalaydjieva in their 
concurring opinion in Varnava ‘should not play any part in the matter and should not take 
measures designed to facilitate the Committee of Ministers’ task in discharging these 
functions’,153 but it does explain the lack of detail in its judgments when compared with the Inter-
American and African bodies. Indeed, we would argue that if the European Court is now 
empowered to include in its operative provisions, for example, a requirement that an applicant 
who was unlawfully dismissed be reinstated,154 then it would also seem to be possible for it to 
order a respondent state, in a case concerning an unresolved killing or disappearance, to carry 
out an effective investigation.  
We have detected a considerable degree of borrowing of concepts and jurisprudence from and 
between each of the regional bodies, particularly around general concepts. This is not always 
consistently applied and it is not always clear why the jurisprudence and practice of the other 
bodies are not acknowledged. For example, there have been significant developments in the 
European Court’s approach to redress in gross violation cases in recent years, which have been 
made without express reliance on the case-law of the Inter-American Court, which is a 
surprising and regrettable omission.155 Clara Sandoval has previously highlighted the Inter-
American Court’s creative use of Article 29 of the American Convention in order to enhance 
human rights protection:156 Article 29 obliges the Court to take account, inter alia, of other 
international treaties when interpreting the Convention. For example, the Inter-American Court 
has applied Article 29 in conjunction with Article 8(1) (the right to a fair trial) in finding that the 
next-of-kin of the disappeared have the right to have an effective investigation, taking due 
account of the UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons Against Enforced 
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Disappearance.157 Similarly, Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter provide the African 
Commission with the mandate to refer to other treaties and jurisprudence of the European and 
Inter-American bodies, among others. Indeed, as has been shown above, it is evident from the 
practice of the African Commission that it is strongly influenced by the jurisprudence from the 
other regional bodies, often citing extensively from their case law and on some occasions 
adopting it as its own. The movement of borrowing and sharing concepts, however, appears to 
be greater in some directions (from the Inter-American and European to the African) than others 
(from the African to the Inter-American and European).  
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